and Rudge (1996 Rudge ( , 1998 . The analysis provided undermines Coyne et al.'s (1997) critique of Wade and Goodnight's (1991) experimental study of Wright's (1931 Wright's ( , 1932 ) Shifting Balance Theory. The essay concludes by further demonstrating how this analysis bears on Diamond's (1986) claims regarding the weakness of laboratory experiments as evidence, and further how the calibration strategy ªts within Lloyd's (1987 Lloyd's ( , 1988 account of the conªrmation of ecological and evolutionary models.
Introduction
This paper explores calibration of laboratory models in population genetics as an experimental strategy for justifying experimental results and claims based upon them. Calibration as such an experimental strategy has been discussed by Franklin (1986 Franklin ( , 1990 Franklin ( , 1997 and Rudge (1996 Rudge ( , 1998 . In those works, the intuition is that scientists have greater reason to believe in the validity of the results of an experimental apparatus when the apparatus can be shown to reproduce known phenomena. This paper explicates a type of calibration that neither Franklin nor Rudge consider in any detail, but which ªts within their frameworks. I argue that the appaThanks to Lindley Darden, Mike Dietrich, Dave Rudge, and an anonymous reviewer for Perspectives on Science for comments that helped improve the paper. Remaining infelicities are my own. Much of the research for this paper was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SBE-9818095; any opinions, ªndings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reºect those of the National Science Foundation. Thanks to Lisa Lloyd and Mike Wade who helped make the grant research possible.
ratuses of laboratory models in population genetics are calibrated to parameters describing natural populations in order to provide scientists greater reason to believe that artiªcial selection experiments done in the laboratory correspond to natural selection processes in natural populations. I further demonstrate how my analysis of calibration bears on claims about the weakness of laboratory experimental evidence made by Diamond (1986) and, further, how the calibration strategy ªts within Lloyd's (1987 Lloyd's ( , 1988 account of the conªrmation of ecological and evolutionary models. Ultimately, my view is that calibration of laboratory models is a key experimental strategy (following Darden's 1991 conception of a strategy) for justifying claims about the relationship between laboratory experiments and natural processes. 1 The paper is driven by a case study in contemporary population genetics somewhat familiar to philosophers of biology, i.e., Wade and Goodnight's (1991) experimental study of Wright's (1931 Wright's ( , 1932 ) Shifting Balance Theory. The calibration strategy under scrutiny in this paper is manifest particularly in defending Wade and Goodnight's (1991) results from recent criticism by Coyne, Barton, and Turelli (1997) . So, the case study, in a narrow sense, is played out as a defense I explore of Wade and Goodnight against Coyne, Barton, and Turelli's criticism, and in a broad sense played out as my articulation of a key epistemological feature of the calibration of laboratory models in population genetics. I begin in section (2) with a brief review of Franklin's and Rudge's explications of calibration. In section (3), I present in some detail Wade and Goodnight's experimental study of Wright's Shifting Balance Theory. In section (4), I present and respond to Coyne, Barton, and Turelli's critique of Wade and Goodnight, highlighting calibration as key to the response. In section (5), I discuss my analysis of calibration in a more philosophical context. Section (6) is reserved for concluding remarks.
Franklin and Rudge on Calibration
Via historical case studies from high energy physics, Franklin (1986 Franklin ( , 1990 ) introduced a set of experimental strategies he packaged as an epistemology of experiment. Franklin's broad aim was to demonstrate that claims based on experimental results are warranted, pace the then key social constructivists of science, such as Collins (1985) . Franklin offered nine experimental strategies in his earlier work, one of which was the strategy of experimental checks and calibration. 2 To demonstrate the reasonable-mental studies done in naturally occurring populations) often make use of certain kinds of traps. The traps are used to capture speciªc organisms for marking, release, and recapture. The data is used for such things as estimates of gene frequency ºuctuation. Rudge says that assuring the traps are in proper working order is part and parcel of experimental checks and calibration (Rudge 1998, p. 348) . Further checks and calibrations, related to the ecological genetics example, might include a review of literature to determine whether a speciªc kind of trap is appropriate for the kind of study one is doing (Rudge 1998, p. 348) . Rudge is echoing Franklin: If an apparatus reproduces known phenomena, then a scientist is justiªed in her belief that the apparatus is reliable. And if the apparatus is reliable, then the results produced by it during an experiment are warranted.
Rudge stretches Franklin's conception of "apparatus" (following Kohler 1994) to make his point, above. For Rudge, the apparatus includes microscopes, vials, dyes, nets, incubators, and even organisms, and populations of organisms (cf. Griesemer and Wade 1988, p. 71) . The calibration of each of these parts of the apparatus are, as Rudge argues, important for assessing whether the experimental apparatus is working properly. After all, in many experiments in evolutionary biology, the evolutionary processes causing change in gene frequencies are under scrutiny. And the apparatuses used in those studies include traps, cages, pipettes, vials, incubators, and populations of organisms. But notice that Rudge's point, above, is made by emphasizing the speciªcally instrumental parts of the apparatus. He only brieºy mentions calibration of the actual populations of organisms that are part of the apparatus (Rudge 1996, p. 266; .
Consider laboratory models, where a laboratory model is an implementation of the materials, apparatus, and maintenance procedures for the apparatus structured by an experimental design (e.g., Griesemer and Wade 1988 , Lloyd 1987 . Calibration of the relevant populations is important for assessing whether the experimental apparatus is working properly as Rudge would argue. But, as Rudge does not argue, and which is equally if not more important, calibration of the relevant populations is crucial to justifying claims based on experimental results that the processes at work in laboratory populations could work in nature (cf. Griesemer and Wade 1988, pp. 71, 81, 84) . The idea is this: Claims based on artiªcial selection experiments done in the laboratory can be justiªably extrapolated to claims about natural selection operating in natural populations if the laboratory model, particularly features of the apparatus as articulated here-the populations of organisms-are matched, or tuned, or calibrated, to relevant features of natural populations. The next two sections articulate this point by contextualizing it within a scientiªc case. (Wade and Goodnight 1991) . At the time, and it seems to me even now, Wade and Goodnight's study represents the most important contemporary experimental study of the SBT in existence. Indeed, it is the only contemporary comprehensive laboratory study of the SBT. Wright developed his SBT in his classic (1931) and (1932) papers and it is fully articulated in his four volume magnum opus, Evolution and the Genetics of Populations (1968 Populations ( , 1969 Populations ( , 1977 Populations ( , 1978 . What Wright was looking for in 1931 and 1932 were the ideal conditions for evolution to occur given speciªc assumptions about the relationship between Mendelian heredity and the adaptive value of gene complexes (Wright 1931, p. 158; 1932, p. 163) . Wright in particular emphasized what he thought of as the universality of gene interaction, or epistasis, and its role in the evolutionary process. The consequences of Wright's emphasis on epistasis led him to the view that the "adaptive landscape" of the possible ªeld of gene combinations in a population of organisms was "hilly" (Wright 1932) . That is, for Wright, the evolutionary consequences of epistasis meant that genes adaptive in one combination would be maladaptive in another. As such, the surface of the adaptive landscape would be made up of adaptive "peaks" and "valleys." Wright's problem, i.e., the problem of "peak shifts," was to articulate the evolutionary process by which a population could make its way to the highest adaptive peak in the fastest time.
Wright argued that the ideal conditions to solve his problem meant that evolution occurred in structured, smallish populations with speciªc mutation and migration rates. Wright's SBT captures these ideal conditions in what he called the shifting balance process. A rough summary of the SBT, sufªcient for my purposes, goes as follows: Evolution proceeds via a shifting balance process through three phases: Phase I-Random genetic drift causes subpopulations semi-isolated within the global population, i.e., demes, to lose ªtness; Phase II-Mass selection on complex genetic interaction systems raises the ªtness of those subpopulations; Phase III-Interdemic selection then raises the ªtness of the large or global population. 4 By 1991, biologists did not know whether the conditions of Wright's phase III (in his theoretical model) were met by populations in nature (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1015) . Indeed, only mathematical investigations, and importantly that by Crow et al. (1990) , had been done. The
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key issue concerning phase III of the SBT is how population structured selection raises the ªtness of the global population. More speciªcally: Population structured selection is selection driven by migration. Members of local populations that are especially ªt migrate to another local population. There, they mate with members of the newly found local population. The traits of the migrants are then spread through the newly foundered local population. This interdemic selection via differential dispersion raises the ªtness of the global population (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1015 (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1016) . Figure 1A depicts the experimental lines in which selection is imposed. Figure 1B depicts Wade and Goodnight's experiment consisted of three experimental and three control treatments using laboratory populations of the ºour beetle, Tribolium castaneum. Each treatment followed either an experimental array or a control array. Each array consisted of 50 demes of 20 breeding adults (N) each. The founders were selected at random from laboratory stock. Fitness of the demes (demic ªtness, W) was measured as the census number of the adult offspring produced by the 20 breeding adults in a 60-day period (P, for productivity).
After 60 days, census data were used to assign relative interdemic ªtnesses. Demes with larger populations had higher relative ªtness than demes with smaller ones. Based on the measures, migrants in the experimental treatments would be dispersed to different demes (this was the imposition of Wright's third phase). In the control group, migration was random, but the number of total migrants (M) was determined by the number of migrants in the corresponding experimental array. Phase III was imposed in the following way: In the experimental array (A), migrants from demes that are high in productivity are placed in demes that are low in productivity. So, there is (artiªcial) migration from demes of high ªtness to demes of low ªtness (following Crow et al. 1990 ). In the control array (B), there is the same amount of migration, but the dispersion is not from demes of high productivity to demes of low productivity. Rather, it is non-patterned. Figure 2 below illustrates one way of imposing population-structured selection driven by differential dispersion. In the experimental array (A), P 1 has the highest relative ªtness. So, migrants are taken from it and put into the migrant pool M. P 3 has a relative ªtness of 1.00, so no migrants are taken. Because the relative ªtness of P 2 is less than 1.00, P 2 receives migrants from the migrant pool M but contributes none. All demes now have 20 members. Notice that migrants were taken from a deme of high ªtness to a deme of low ªtness. This is the essence of Wright's third phase. In the control array (B), the migration pattern from P 1 . . . P n to the migrant pool M and back into P 1 . . . P n is random, but the same numbers migrate (which is a function of the experimental array's census).
The experimental (E) treatments were imposed three times and each had their own control (C) treatments. The pairs of experimental (E) and control (C) treatments differed with regard to the frequency with which artiªcial selection was imposed. In the ªrst treatment (E1-C1), experimental and control protocols were imposed every generation. In the E2-C2 pair, the protocols were imposed every two generations: In alternating, non-selection generations, 20 adults were selected at random from each deme in the experimental array (E2) of 50 demes and each group of 20 was used to reestablish a deme; the same was done in the C2 control (there was no migration of any kind in the odd E2-C2 generations). In the E3-C3 pair, the protocols were imposed every third generation analogous to the E2-C2 treatment.
Wade and Goodnight varied the imposition of differential and random migration in the three trials in order to investigate the interaction between random genetic drift and (directional) interdemic selection. Because Wade and Goodnight varied the treatments in the way that they did, they were able to further investigate Wright's shifting balance process as a whole rather than simply the third phase. The results, summarized graphically, are reproduced in Figure 3 below.
The interdemic selection differential in the three experimental treatments is the difference between the mean productivity of the selected parent demes (⌺ i i i w P / 50) and the mean productivity of the unselected demes (P.), divided by the standard deviation of the unselected array (see Figure 1B ). The standardized response to interdemic selection is the difference between the means of the experimental and control treatment pairs divided by the standard deviation of the control. The regression of the standardized response on the cumulative selection differential is the realized interdemic heritability.
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Fig. 2:
Reproduction of an example of Wade and Goodnight's (1991, p. 1017) imposition of selection driven by differential dispersion. Fig. 2A is the experimental array; Fig. 2B is the control array.
An additive population genetics model was used to predict results. On the additive model, the expected results are that the three treatments will show that the responses to selection, i.e., the differences in mean phenotype between the progeny generation and the previous generation, are homogeneous (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1017) . That is, the slopes of the lines in E1-C1, E2-C2, E3-C3 ought to all be homogeneous. Such results are expected because on an additive selection model, according to which random genetic drift and directional selection oppose each other, the response to interdemic selection should be proportional to the selection differential, i.e., the difference in mean phenotype between the selected parents and the entire parental population. After all, on the additive assumption random genetic drift acts to increase genetic variation among demes whereas directional interdemic selection should, given the assumption of additivity of genetic variance, act to decrease variation among demes. 5 Indeed, using an additive model, the expected F ST values (inbreeding coefªcients measuring population structure, or the among-deme genetic variation, see Wright 1951a Wright , 1969 can be computed (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1017) . Given a ratio of effective population size (N e )-the number of individuals in a theoretical ideal population having the same magnitude of genetic drift as the actual population-to observed deme size (N) (where N e Ͻ N) of 0.90, the expected F ST increases almost linearly by generation: 0.0278 after one generation, 0.0548 after two generations, and 0.0811 after three generations (with no migration). If there are only additive genetic effects on ªtness (and if the environment is held constant), then the interdemic selection differential is proportional to F ST . This means that the interdemic selection differential in the E2 treatment should be twice that of the E1 treatment and the E3 treatment three times that of the E1 treatment. The frequency of selection in Wade and Goodnight's experiments is the inverse of the above. So, the smaller selection differential applied every generation in E1 should produce the same response as the selection differential in E2, or three times that in E3.
During the experiment, Wade and Goodnight measured effective deme size and random genetic drift using a single locus (Wade and Goodnight
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5. The assumption of additivity of genetic variance means effects of alleles on phenotypes are averaged over the variety of genetic combinations in which they occur; an allele is said to act additively if its effect is independent of the other alleles with which it is combined. Notice that this assumption contrasts with Wright's emphasis on the non-additive component of genetic variance, i.e., the statistical effects of the interaction of an allele with the other alleles with which it is combined, such as epistasis and dominance. The role of the additive model in contrast to Wright's emphasis on non-additive genetic variance will become clearer as the discussion proceeds. 1991, p. 1018). Observed F ST (in C2 at generation 13) was 0.0288. In the next generation, the F ST was 0.0470. There appears to be an almost linear increase in F ST (as the additive model predicted). Wade and Goodnight further found that the ratio of effective population size to observed deme size was 0.90, agreeing with their estimates from the additive model discussed above. In spite of the agreement between expected and observed F ST and (N e /N) ratio, Wade and Goodnight did not get the expected results: As is manifest, the slopes of the lines in Figure 3 are heterogeneous, not homogeneous.
In Figure 3 , the regression of the responses to selection on the cumulative selection differential for all treatments (E1-C1, E2-C2, E3-C3) is shown. This is the realized interdemic heritability. All of the slopes are greater than zero indicating a statistically signiªcant response to the imposed interdemic selection in all treatments. The heterogeneity of the slopes are contrary to the additive model's prediction that because selection is standardized across the X-axis in all treatments the responses should all be equal (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1018) : The realized interdemic heritability was two times greater in the E2 (0.383) than in the E1 treatment (0.207) (in spite of the reduced selection frequency). Additionally, the realized interdemic heritability in E1 (0.207) was equivalent to that of E3 (0.205) (again in spite of the reduced frequency of selection in the E3). Finally, even though E2 and E3 were nearly equal in total heritability (S) (2.826 vs. 2.565) and average population size given migration (N m ) (0.99 vs. 0.86) the response to selection was two times larger in E2.
According to Wade and Goodnight, if there are non-additive gene effects on ªtness of the sort Wright emphasized, then random genetic drift can operate to more rapidly produce signiªcant heritable variation among demes. However, Wade and Goodnight did not know the distribution of adaptive peaks owing to co-dependent gene complexes. Moreover, Wade and Goodnight did not know the extent to which interdemic selection by differential dispersion could export the gene combinations to other demes of lower ªtness. Wade and Goodnight do cite Crow et al. (1990) , who suggest that the rate could be low. Nevertheless, Wade and Goodnight conclude that their experimental design is a laboratory model of Wright's shifting balance process (based on the realized response to their imposition of third phase selection).
Based on their experimental study, Wade and Goodnight (1991, p. 1018) conclude that phase III of Wright's shifting balance process can cause an evolutionary change in mean ªtness compared to control populations (non-shifting balance populations) with identical amounts of island model migration. Wade and Goodnight further claim that because their Wright (1931 Wright ( , 1932 Wright ( , 1977 Wright ( , 1978 argued that the shifting balance process described by the SBT should affect evolution with this degree of genetic subdivision. Loveless and Hamrick (1984) and Wright (1978) contain comprehensive reviews of data concerning population size and structure among plants and animals. Loveless and Hamrick pay special attention to the ecological determinants of the genetic structure of populations of plants. They review isozyme data from 163 studies representing 124 plant taxa to examine the associations between ecological factors and the distribution of allozyme variation. Each taxon was classiªed across 10 ecological traits, viz., breeding system, ºoral morphology, mode of reproduction, pollination mechanism, seed dispersal, phenology, life cycle, timing of reproduc- Wright (1978, especially chapters 2, 3, 6 , 9) provides a comprehensive review of population structure data from a staggering number of studies. Wright found F ST values between 0.03 and 0.05 in various species of trees, perennials such as Phlox pilosa, the desert annual Linanthus parryae, as well as varieties of Drosophila, the land snail Cepaea nemoralis, the rusty lizard, Sceloporus olivaceus, the prairie mouse, Peromyscus polionotus, and human groups based on blood group data. As in the Loveless and Hamrick (1984) review, Wright's statistical analyses cut across numerous ecological factors. The aim of Wright's review, the last volume of his four volume magnum opus, is a sweeping analysis of variability within and among natural populations. The work is not without its critics (e.g., Coyne et al. 1997) , and itself critically reanalyzes historical work Wright, with others (such as Dobzhansky), had done during the period of the evolutionary synthesis (1930s-1950s) .
Ultimately, because the structure of the population in Wade and Goodnight's laboratory model is calibrated to population structure of a variety of natural populations, and that population structure is ideal for Wright's shifting balance processes to occur, there is reason to think that the shifting balance process as observed in the laboratory corresponds to evolutionary processes as they occur in nature (see also Crow 1991 for a similar, brief, interpretation of Wade and Goodnight 1991) . More abstractly, Wade and Goodnight think that because their laboratory system is calibrated to natural systems, the claims made about the laboratory system can be extrapolated to natural systems. In the next section of the paper, the calibration strategy is applied in the context of a recent critique of Wade and Goodnight's (1991) experimental study by Coyne et al. (1997) .
A Response to Coyne, Barton and Turelli's Critique of Wade and Goodnight
In 1997, Coyne, Barton, and Turelli published what is now a well-known critique of Wright's SBT (Coyne et al. 1997) . In that paper, Coyne et al. argue that Wright's SBT describes a relatively insigniªcant evolutionary process, opting for the mass selection alternative originally described by R. A. Fisher (1930 Fisher ( , 1958 Fisher ( , 1999 . Brieºy, Fisher's Large Population Size Theory (LPST) embraces assumptions at odds with Wright's SBT. In particular, Fisher emphasized that the ultimate fate of a gene is determined by its average effect with respect to ªtness, i.e., that alleles act additively on between epistasis (non-additive genetic effects on ªtness), population structure, and interdemic selection account for the response to selection reported. However, according to Coyne et al., without a mass selection control group to compare to the shifting balance experimental group, Wade and Goodnight's experiment does not impeach the alternative that mass selection on additive genetic effects accounts for the experimental data.
On Coyne et al.'s view, interdemic selection can occur on any mode of gene action, including the simple case of selection for an additive trait governed by a single locus. Wade and Goodnight's imposition of selection by differential dispersion is based on an experimental design that assumes that demes contribute to the next generation in proportion to the deme's mean phenotypic value. This method is based on the quantitative genetics concept of family-selection, or the view that only the family-groups (demes) with the highest mean ªtness can contribute to the next generation (Falconer 1989) . Coyne et al. (1997, p. 663) claim that the familyselection design allows that selection can modify almost any trait (of the beetle or any other organism), including traits that are commonly understood as modiªed by mass selection (like bristle number in Drosophila).
In order for Wade and Goodnight to show that the SBT unambiguously accounts for their data, they must, say Coyne et al., compare an experimental shifting balance treatment against a mass selection control treatment. The direct comparison would provide Wade and Goodnight with a way to distinguish between traits affected by interdemic selection and traits affected by mass selection. But Wade and Goodnight do no such thing-the control arrays are unselected (see above, especially Figure 1 ). According to Coyne et al., because Wade and Goodnight do not control for mass selection, there is no justiªable way for them to make the claim that they have provided empirical support for Wright's SBT. Only a precise comparison between interdemic selection on the shifting balance process and mass selection will resolve the problem.
Coyne et al.'s second objection to Wade and Goodnight's experimental study of the SBT concerns the ambiguity of experimental results due to lack of replication of the experimental treatments (E1-E3). Wright (1931 Wright ( , 1932 claims that non-additive genetic effects on ªtness are foundational to understanding the evolutionary process. Indeed, as we saw at the beginning of section (3) above, Wright includes such effects as core elements of evolution in his SBT. Wade and Goodnight (1991) claim to have supported Wright's inclusion via the results of their shifting balance process laboratory experiment represented in Figure 3 . Recall that Wade and Goodnight claimed that because the slopes of the lines in the E1-E3 treatments were heterogeneous that non-additive effects on ªtness were present 382
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(see especially E2, selection every other generation). The conclusion is that the heterogeneity of the slopes shows that non-additive genetic effects are involved in the observed response to selection. Coyne et al. (1997, p. 663) object that because Wade and Goodnight only used one experimental line for each of the three experimental treatments they have not appropriately removed doubt that their data is not affected by artifacts of the experimental design. According to Coyne et al., the results in the E2 experimental line could be due to, e.g., some sort of sampling artifact in that line. Had Wade and Goodnight replicated all three lines, there may be reason to claim that the results of the E2 treatments could be used to support a claim that nonadditive genetic effects on ªtness were an evolutionary factor. However, Coyne et al. doubt even that proposition: "Even if their [Wade and Goodnight's 1991] experimental results were seen in multiple lines, however, it would not prove the existence of epistasis: It is also the case that in models of group selection acting on a single locus, the largest response can occur with intermittent selection" (Coyne et al. 1997, p. 663 ; see the supporting study by Wilson and Colwell 1981 treatments. Indeed, Wade and Goodnight use, as a control, a set of unselected treatments as a way to demonstrate a response to interdemic selection. However, as a further and alternative way of justifying their claim that Wright's third phase is operating, Wade and Goodnight do the fol-lowing. They argue that a feature of their laboratory apparatus, speciªcally F ST measures of population structure, is calibrated to a variety of plant and animal systems in nature (viz., the above cited reviews by Loveless and Hamrick 1984 and Wright 1978) . Recall that for the shifting balance process to work, the right kind of population structure is key. Moreover, the precise population structure reported by Wade and Goodnight is indicative of non-additive genetic variance (Wade 1991 , Wade and Goodnight 1998 , Wright 1978 . For these two reasons, it is crucial for Wade and Goodnight to emphasize the calibration of their F ST measures.
In broad strokes, Wade and Goodnight use the calibration strategy to ground their claim that there is a non-additive basis to their response to interdemic selection and impeach the alternative hypothesis that the genetic basis of the response is additive. More speciªcally, Wade and Goodnight use the calibration strategy to bolster their claim that there is a non-additive genetic basis to their reported response to interdemic selection in two ways. The ªrst way corresponds to Franklin's (1986 Franklin's ( , 1990 ) and Rudge's (1996 Rudge's ( , 1998 analysis of calibration discussed in section (2) above. That is, Wade and Goodnight tune F ST measures of their laboratory population to natural populations to demonstrate that their apparatus is working properly, thereby warranting their experimental results. The second way that Wade and Goodnight use the calibration strategy is to warrant their broader claim that their experimental results provide reason to think that Wright's shifting balance process is likely to occur in nature. Analysis of how the latter use of calibration works, a central aim of this paper, is spelled out in some detail in section (5) below.
Coyne et al. miss Wade and Goodnight's use of calibration as a strategy for disambiguating between allowable interpretations of their experimental results. Yet, the two ways in which Wade and Goodnight use the calibration strategy plausibly trump Coyne et al.'s demand for a mass selection control group. After all, via calibration Wade and Goodnight provide independent reasons for thinking that the apparatus is working properly and, as we will see below, they extrapolate their claims about the laboratory model to natural systems.
A general response more illustrative of my line of reasoning against Coyne et al. can be made to their second charge, regarding the lack of replication of experimental lines. The idea is that Coyne et al. are myopically focusing on a speciªc experimental methodology when what they must do, if they are to accurately depict Wade and Goodnight's experimental design, is criticize the host of experimental methods that Wade and Goodnight in fact use. Differently put, there is a set of experimental methods, in particular calibration, that Wade and Goodnight use as a package to justify their claim that the shifting balance process is operating. Arguably, the package of methods that Wade and Goodnight use trumps the singular methods on which Coyne et al. focus. Anyway, Coyne et al. do not even consider this point because they do not scrutinize the actual experimental methods that Wade and Goodnight use. It is on these grounds that Coyne et al.'s criticism is weak (if not also unfair).
In the above defense of Wade and Goodnight (1991) , I drive a wedge between alternative methods for justifying claims based on experimental results. Coyne et al. complain that Wade and Goodnight fail to exercise proper experimental controls and to replicate their experimental lines. My view is that the calibration strategy is a key part of a package of strategies employed by Wade and Goodnight and that it trumps Coyne et al.'s critique. In the next section of the paper, I show how the calibration strategy provides the justiªcation it does for Wade and Goodnight's claim that their laboratory experimental results show that Wright's shifting balance process is likely to occur in nature. Further, I show how the strategy might ªt into an epistemology of experiment reºective of the case study discussed.
Calibration as an Experimental Strategy
As we have seen, Franklin and Rudge have discussed calibration as an experimental strategy for warranting claims that an experimental apparatus is working properly, which thereby warrants the results produced by using that apparatus. As I view the strategy, calibration of laboratory models further warrants hypotheses that artiªcial selection experiments done in the laboratory correspond to the way selection works in natural populations. So, calibration is not merely a strategy for justifying results in the way Franklin and Rudge argue, it is further a strategy that is used to justify results from laboratory experiments by demonstrating that those results can be extrapolated to natural populations.
But how does calibration do what I claim it does? I argue for the following related claims: (a) Calibration of laboratory models increases the justiªcatory strength of empirical claims based on laboratory experiments; (b) Calibration accomplishes (a) via its connection with speciªc elements of Lloyd's (1987 Lloyd's ( , 1988 conªrmation view. Indeed, making these two points clear articulates the conceptual foundations of the crux of my defense of Wade and Goodnight against Coyne et al.'s critique in section (4) above.
Consider claim (a). A claim of Diamond's (1986) that is of special interest here is that he views the evidence gathered from different sorts of experimental procedures, as he calls them (Diamond 1986, p. 3), as weighed differently in evaluation contexts. Diamond distinguishes between three different kinds of experiments, viz., laboratory experiments, ªeld experi-ments, and natural experiments. According to Diamond, the evidence gathered from natural experiments is the strongest, and so on down the line to laboratory experiments, which provide the weakest evidence, all else equal.
Diamond claims that laboratory (and ªeld) experiments have an air of artiªciality about them that can weaken their justiªcatory role relative to the "reality" of natural experiments (Diamond 1986, p. 5) . The artiªciality of laboratory and ªeld experiments consists in, importantly, experimenter intervention in the experimental system. Wade and Goodnight's imposition of phase III of Wright's SBT is an artiªcial perturbation in their Tribolium population. Indeed, such intervention is intentional artiªcial selection on populations to observe its downstream effects on genetic variation. On Diamond's view, the observation of the same perturbation occurring naturally, i.e., without experimenter interference, would be less artiªcial, or more realistic (in the sense that phase III would occur naturally). As such, the evidence of a natural perturbation would be stronger than evidence from an intentional one, all else equal (Diamond 1986, pp. 5, 9, 13, 19) . To be sure, intervention is not the only sort of artiªciality in evolutionary biology experiments: Use of, e.g., laboratory populations in highly controlled environments is a further instance. (So, evidence from a laboratory experiment might, e.g., be weaker than evidence from a ªeld experiment given that the ªeld experiment might involve the use of natural populations, but also intervention.)
It is possible to see how the relative strength of evidence given its experimental source (i.e., from the laboratory or the ªeld) arises in the case of Wade and Goodnight's experiment. In Wade and Goodnight's study concern is expressed regarding whether phase III selection is an important evolutionary process in nature (Wade and Goodnight 1991, p. 1018 ). Wade and Goodnight assume that the laboratory imposition of phase III on the ºour beetle population is not enough to establish such a conclusion. Indeed, other ways of providing justiªcation of that claim are required in addition to the intervention. Wade and Goodnight used, as we saw, calibration of population structure of their laboratory population of beetles to a variety of natural populations. The idea is to increase the strength of the claim that phase III selection is important in nature as opposed to (merely) achievable in the laboratory by showing that the populations are comparably structured to those in nature. The strength of the empirical claim is increased by increasing what Diamond calls the reality of the laboratory experiment. That is, by tempering the air of artiªciality of the laboratory intervention using the calibration strategy, Wade and Goodnight increase the degree of reality Diamond requires for experimental results to gain strength. I consider this idea a bit more fully below.
Given the above, Diamond's claim about the greatest weakness of laboratory experiments is weakened given the calibration strategy. That is, what calibration does is provide a practical articulation of what Griesemer and Wade (1988, p. 77) claim is the character of the inference from causes observed in the laboratory to causes in nature. Their idea is that the scientist ªnds matches between the causes in the laboratory and causes in nature. My view is that calibration of laboratory populations to natural populations is a key experimental strategy for demonstrating those matches. According to Griesemer and Wade (1988) , analogical reasoning drives the matching between laboratory model and natural system. I have no dispute with Griesemer and Wade about the analogical character of the matching inference. My aim has been to specify the practical strategy used for making that inference and how to view that strategy as warranting the claim being made. The ensuing discussion of claim (b) above, that calibration increases the justiªcatory strength of empirical claims based on laboratory experiments via its connection with speciªc elements of Lloyd's (1987 Lloyd's ( , 1988 conªrmation view, ºeshes out my claim about warrant.
Lloyd (1987, 1988) has argued that conªrmation of evolutionary and ecological models can be practically speciªed by the following three strategies, viz., (1) ªt between theoretical model and data; (2) independent support for aspects of a particular theoretical model; and (3) variety of evidence (which includes varieties of instances of ªt and independent support). 7 Following Lloyd (1988, pp. 146-52) , brieºy, ªt between model and data is the determination of a matching between the predictions of a theoretical model and experimental results. Demonstrating ªt relies on straightforward statistical curve ªtting techniques. Independent support for aspects of a particular model concerns independently garnered empirical evidence for speciªc assumptions built into a particular theoretical model. Variety of evidence ampliªes the two strategies above and comes in three forms, viz., variety of instances of ªt, variety of independent support for aspects of a model, and variety of types of support.
Lloyd sees herself as describing at least part of the set of techniques evolutionary biologists use to relate theoretical models to natural systems. More speciªcally, she sees her three conªrmation strategies as concretely articulating techniques that are part and parcel of an experimental model (following Suppes 1962) . In the context of my discussion of calibration, the laboratory model (deªned in section 2 above) corresponds to a speciªc instantiation (in the laboratory) of Lloyd's conception of an experimental
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model. And I see my discussion as specifying even more concretely Lloyd's conªrmation account as an articulation of an experimental model. That is, I see calibration as a speciªcally experimental strategy that is used to spell out how to understand the relative strength of the claims that there is ªt between model and data, independent support for aspects of a model, and variety of evidence. Variety of evidence is at the core of Lloyd's conªrmation account. Variety of evidence as a strategy itself is at bottom iterations and/or combinations of the strategies of ªt between theoretical model and data and independent support for aspects of a theoretical model. Lloyd's intuition behind variety of evidence is that numerous demonstrations of, e.g., ªt, or, e.g., independent support, can increase the strength of the hypothesis that a theoretical model corresponds to the natural system modeled. That is, 10 instances of ªt over data for populations of size 1000 places a relevant hypothesis in a different conªrmation situation than 10 instances of ªt over data for populations ranging in size between 1 and 1,000,000 (Lloyd 1988, p. 148) . A similar claim can be made for independent support. The more times, the more different ways, and the more assumptions are tested independently, the greater the empirical support for an hypothesis made about a model that is based on the assumption. Variety of types of support is just a mixture of variety of instances of ªt and variety of independent support. So, an hypothesis made about a theoretical model that has a variety of instances of ªt along with a variety of instances of independent support for its assumptions is in a different situation regarding its conªrmation than a theory with only one instance of ªt.
Here is how I see the explicit connection between the strategy of evaluating variety of evidence and calibration in grounding the strength of Wade and Goodnight's claim. Wade and Goodnight's laboratory model included, as a part of its apparatus, laboratory populations of Tribolium. Their aim was to use those populations to determine whether Wright's phase III and, more generally, Wright's SBT, could be considered to describe an important evolutionary process. As I discussed in sections (3) and (4) above, the main way Wade and Goodnight argued that Wright's SBT is important in evolution is by calibrating the population structure of the ºour beetle population to the same aspect of other natural populations (of plants and animals, reviewed by Loveless and Hamrick 1984, Wright 1978 ). As we saw, the F ST measure indicating population structure was chosen for calibration because such population structure is crucial to the operation of Wright's shifting balance process. Moreover, such population structure is indicative of non-additive genetic variance, a foundational assumption of Wright's SBT. Wade and Goodnight's view is, it seems to me, as follows: If such a match between an aspect of the laboratory population 388
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and populations in nature exists, and that factor is central to bringing about evolutionary change on Wright's SBT, then the shifting balance process can be (according to Wade and Goodnight) considered as likely to describe an important evolutionary process. The calibration of the laboratory population, a part of the apparatus (which also included, vials, ºour, incubators, microscopes, etc.), played a crucial role in Wade and Goodnight's evaluation of their results. Wade and Goodnight did not merely calibrate their ºour beetle population to, e.g., another laboratory or natural population of ºour beetles. Rather, they calibrated their data to several, various natural populations for which the relevant population structure data had been previously collected (Loveless and Hamrick 1984, Wright 1978) . So, in order to strengthen their empirical claim that Wright's SBT is important in evolution, Wade and Goodnight provided a variety of evidence, speciªcally, a variety of independent support of aspects of a theoretical model by calibrating their laboratory model to natural populations. Differently put, a key assumption built into Wright's SBT is that populations are structured in speciªc ways. This assumption provides for speciªc conditions for the shifting balance process to be realized, speciªcally the interaction between epistasis, migration, and interdemic selection. Relevant to Wade and Goodnight's experimental study, F ST values should be in the range 0.03-0.05 to satisfy the assumption. By calibrating their laboratory model to natural populations, Wade and Goodnight provide independent support for an aspect of Wright's SBT (which is a family of theoretical models). As we saw, F ST values for Wade and Goodnight's laboratory population ªt F ST values in the 0.03-0.05 range across a variety of populations found in nature, viz., 13 different species of plant reviewed by Loveless and Hamrick (1984) and numerous species of plant and animal reviewed by Wright (1978) . Further, by providing numerous and varied instances of independent support for this key assumption of Wright's SBT, Wade and Goodnight increase the conªrmatory standing of their hypothesis via a variety of evidence.
The use of calibration by Wade and Goodnight ªts the core of Lloyd's conªrmation account nicely. One way to increase the conªrmatory standing of an hypothesis is to provide independent support for aspects of a theoretical model in a variety of ways. Wade and Goodnight increased the conªrmatory standing of Wright's SBT by providing, via the calibration of their laboratory model, a variety of evidence in the form of a variety of independent support of aspects of the SBT.
What I have argued so far is that the key epistemological strategy for understanding the justiªcation of Wade and Goodnight's claim that Wright's SBT is an important evolutionary process in nature is driven by the calibration of the apparatus, i.e., the ºour beetle population, of their laboratory model to populations in nature. This calibration strategy allows Wade and Goodnight to claim that the shifting balance process imposed in the laboratory corresponds to instances of evolution in nature. Further, the way in which the calibration strategy was used, i.e., by marshalling a variety of independent support for aspects of the SBT, increases the strength of their claim.
I have said that calibration as an experimental strategy speciªes Lloyd's (1987 Lloyd's ( , 1988 conªrmation account. Lloyd takes her account to be a practical speciªcation of the evaluation of experimental models. I take myself to have extended that speciªcation by articulating a concrete experimental strategy that is used to generate the very types of justiªcations that Lloyd (rightly) demands. My working hypothesis is that such could be done for a number of experimental strategies, such as those delineated by Franklin (1986 Franklin ( , 1990 Franklin ( , 2002 and Rudge (1996 Rudge ( , 1998 . However, doing so here is beyond the scope of the essay, because another key aim has been to defend Wade and Goodnight (1991) from charges leveled at them by Coyne, Barton, and Turelli (1997) .
At any rate, Franklin and Rudge have articulated calibration, among other strategies, in their own epistemological frameworks. As we saw, Franklin (1986 Franklin ( , 1990 and one version of Rudge (1998) used Bayesian epistemology to run their epistemology of experiment. Rudge (2001) later argued that Mayo's (1996) error statistical approach better depicts his case, i.e., industrial melanism in the peppered moth. I present calibration as part of, and connected to, a further set of theory evaluation strategies (following Darden 1991 on the concept of a strategy). Nevertheless, a Bayesian or error statistical gloss on the strategies presented here could, at least to some extent, be used to more formally "epistemologize" them.
Conclusion
I have argued that Wade and Goodnight (1991) used calibration as an experimental strategy for warranting their claim that Wright's SBT is an important evolutionary process. Moreover, I have shown how their use of calibration defends them from Coyne et al.'s (1997) objection that the results are ambiguous. Ultimately, my view is that calibration of laboratory models is a key experimental strategy for warranting claims made via laboratory experiments in population genetics. Calibration allows an experimenter in population genetics to warrant claims about the correspondence between laboratory systems and natural systems.
